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Public debt in the USA: How much, how bad and who pays?

Abstract
The USA is in the middle of the pack of industrial countries as regards the public debt GDP and public deficit-GDP ratios. The period since 1980 is the only peace-time period outside
the Great Depression to see a sustained increase in the debt-GDP ratio.
The budgetary retrenchment planned by the Clinton administration is likely to prove
insufficient to achieve a sustainable path, although the remaining permanent primary
(non
interest) gap is small: between 0.1% and 1.0% of GDP. The maximal amount of seignior
age
revenue that can be extracted at a constant rate of inflation is not far from the recent historica
l
value of less that 0.5% of GDP.
Subtracting net public sector investment from the conventional budget deficit is likely to
overstate the government revenue producing potential of public sector investment.
Public debt matters when markets are incomplete and/or lump-sum taxes are restricted.
Future interest payments associated with the public debt are not equivalent to currently expected
future transfer payments. Even ignoring the distortionary character of most real-world taxes
and
transfers, and holding costant the government's exhaustive spending program, the "generat
ional
accounts" are therefore not a sufficient statistic for the effect on aggregate consumption
of the
government's tax-transfer program.
Solving the immediate budgetary problems still leaves the much more serious
macroeconomic problems of an undersized US Federal government sector and an inadequ
ate US
national saving rate.

JEL classification numbers: E31, E41, E62, E63, E65, HI I, H23, H31, H54, H55.
Keywords: Public debt; solvency; inflation tax; public sector investment; crowding out.
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L Introduction.

During the 1992 Presidential election campaign in the USA, the Federal budget deficit
became an important political issue. The independent candidate, Mr. Perot, characterized the level
and growth rate of the national debt as

major threats to the prosperity of the nation, and

especially to the well-being of our children. He promised to make the elimination of the deficit
his top priority in the field of economic policy. The incumbent President, Mr. Bush, who during
eight years as vice-president and four years as President had seen the gross Federal debt held by
the public increase from $709 billion at the end of 1980 (26.8% of GDP) to $2,998 billion at the
end of 1992 (51.1 % of GDP), was on the defensive on the issue throughout the campaign.
Governor Clinton's position during the campaign can be characterized as a qualified version of
Perot's. He too considered it important that the deficit be brought down, but he did not want to
commit himself to immediate measures to do so (and might well take measures that would
increase the deficit in the short run) in order not to abort the fledgling recovery.
In this paper I intend to review and evaluate the current budgetary situation in the USA.
The purpose is to establish whether, and in what sense, there is a public debt and deficit problem,
how important it is and what can be done about it. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section
II contains a brief review of the American experience with government debt and deficits, from
a historical and comparative international perspective.

Section III restates a familiar simple

accounting framework for tracing the evolution of the debt over time. This is also a key input
into any evaluation of the sustainability of the public sector's fiscal-financial-monetary program
and of the magnitude of the fiscal correction required to ensure solvency of the government.
Section IV reviews the reasons why public sector debt and deficits may matter for real economic
performance. Section V considers a number of issues related to the financing of public sector
investment. Section VI concludes.

II. US government debt and deficits in historical and international perspective.
The history of the Federal debt-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio since 1790 is shown
in Figure 1. Two facts stand out. First, the current (end of 1991) value of the ratio of gross
Federal debt held by the public to GDP is, at 45% percent1 , quite high by historical standards,
although still well below the peak value of 107% achieved at the end of World War II. Second,
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there have been only two peace-time periods during which the debt-GDP ratio rose for other than
normal cyclical reasons.
The first of these is the period 193 0-193 5; the steep increase in the public debt-GDP ratio
during that period can be attributed straightforwardly to the cataclysm of the Great Depression..
The other episode of sustained peace-time growth in the public debt-GDP ratio is the decade of
the l 980's, continuing into at least the first few years of the l 990's. Apart from these two
episodes, only major wars (the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War I and especially
World War II) are associated with dramatic increases in the debt-GDP ratio. During peace time
the debt-GDP ratio has been amortized by budget surpluses (in the 19th century), by real
economic growth (in both centuries) and by inflation (since World War I). When one realizes
that a significant part of the increase in the debt-GDP ratio in the early 30's reflected the behavior
of the real component of the denominator (real GDP fell by almost 30% between 1929 and 1933),
the period since 1980 really stands out as an age of unparalleled peace-time deficits.
Lest an unwarranted sense of confidence in the public debt data overtake one, I present
in Figures 2 and 3 some alternative series. While each one shows a significant increase since
1980 in a measure of public sector indebtedness, the levels of the various series differ
considerably. The FNFL series in Figure 2 , measuring Federal government net financial
liabilities2, is very close, for the years during which they overlap, to the series for Gross Federal
debt held by the public, shown in Figure 1. The GNFL series, constructed on the same basis as
FNFL shows how the General government3 debt-GDP ratio is dominated by the behavior of the
Federal government. The FND series of Bohn [1992] , giving the Federal government's net
financial debt as a percentage of GNP, has exceeded the FNFL figure by more than 20% of GDP
since 1970. The difference is largely accounted for by the accrued pension liabilities of Federal
government employees, which amounted to 23% of GDP in 1989.. The current value of Deposit
Insurance Guarantees only accounted for 2. 9% of GDP in that same year. Note that tangible
government assets (reproducible capital and land and mineral rights) are not allowed for in the
net debt figure (although financial assets are), and neither are any estimates of the government's
implicit "liability" associated with the social security system.
In the analysis of Sections III and IV, the non-monetary net financial liabilities of the
Federal and General government sectors is what matters. These are shown in Figure 3.

3
From a contemporary international perspective, the government debt to GDP and deficit
to GDP ratios of the USA place it in the middle of the pack of industrial countries. Table 1
shows that at the end of 1992, the General government net debt ranged from 124.3% of GDP
for Belgium to -16.6% of GDP for oil-rich Norway. At 37.9%, the US General government was
just below the (unweighted) average of 43.6% for the 18 OECD countries shown in Table 1.
Again there is a need for caution in interpreting these data, as becomes evident by comparing
Tables 1 and Table 2, which presents for the 7 largest OECD countries the ratio of General
government gross debt to GDP. While in Table 1 general government financial assets are netted
out against financial liabilities, Table 2 ignores the financial assets.

The difference is quite

dramatic, except for Italy and the UK 4 • Table 1 also shows that for 16 out of 18 OECD countries
(the exceptions are the UK and the USA), the net debt-GDP ratio was already rising in the
second half of the l 970's.

The first OPEC oil price shock was the proximate cause of this

phenomenon. The rise in the net debt-GDP ratio in the US during the l 980's was shared by all
other OECD countries reported in Tables 1 and 2, except for Japan, the UK and Norway.
As regards the government deficit, Table 3 shows that, of the seven largest OECD
countries, only the USA and Canada experienced an increase in the deficit-GDP ratio between
1980 and 1990. This cannot be explained in terms of cyclical differences, as the US economy
was only just sliding into recession in the second half of 1990. The magnitude of the 1992 US
general government deficit, shown to be 4. 7% of GDP in Table 4, is large both historically and
5
by current international standards, but between 1.0 and 1.5 percentage points can probably be
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accounted for by the depressed state of the economy in that year • Table 4 also makes the point

that throughout the post-World War II period, the combined State and Local government sector
has run a budget surplus. The magnitude of this surplus has, however, shrunk since the middle
of the 1980's, probably as a result of President Reagan's reduction in the scope of Revenue
Sharing and, more recently, for cyclical reasons. The deficit is clearly a Federal phenomenon,
although grants from the Federal government to the State and Local governments exceeded the
combined budget surplus of the latter two sectors even during 1991 and 1992.
Note that the net interest paid by the Federal government exceeds that paid by the general
government by a considerable amount (0.8% of GDP in 1992). State and local government
jointly are net recipients of interest income. The Federal primary deficit (the conventional
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financial deficit minus net interest paid)

is therefore smaller than the General government

primary deficit.
Table 5 shows the behavior since 1984 of the General government primary balances in
the seven largest OECD countries. The primary deficit is the conventional financial deficit minus
interest paid and received. It is of interest because, in a way that will be made precise below,
when the government is solvent, the existing stock of debt is serviced with future primary
surpluses. The 2.5% of GDP General government primary deficit in 19927 is after the UK (with
a 4.5% of GDP primary deficit) the largest of the seven major OECD countries. All of the
OECD was either in full recession during 1992 or just coming out of it (as in the case of the
USA).

m. Accounting

for the debt.

A simple explicit accounting framework is indispensable for an evaluation of the
budgetary position. The key points can be made in the context of a closed economy. Since the
US government only borrows by issuing US dollar-denominated debt and the stock of US official
international reserve assets is small 8,. this simplification does not represent a serious distortion
of the US government's accounts. Any quantitative general equilibrium evaluation of the US
experience will of course have to allow for its openness to trade, factor movements and financial
flows, regardless of the currency denomination of the government's financial portfolio.
In what follows, government will refer to the consolidated general government and Federal
Reserve System. 9 The following notation is used: Mis the nominal stock of base money 1°, which
bears a zero nominal interest rate; B is the stock of interest-bearing government debt, assumed
for simplicity to have a fixed nominal face value and a variable nominal interest rate, i; S is the
nominal value of the primary budget surplus of the government, that is, its financial surplus
minus net interest paid on its debt; P is the general price level; C is the volume of government
consumption, A the volume of government gross investment (A~ 0), T the real value of taxes
minus transfers and subsidies and K the government real capital stock, valued at current
reproduction cost1 1• The flow of sales of public sector capital to the private sector, at a price pk
per unit of privatized capital, is denoted

n. The gross real rate of return on public sector capital

appropriated by the government 12 , henceforth its cash real rate of return, is denoted p. The
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physical depreciation rate of government capital 1s denoted 8. The budget identity of the
government is given in equation (1 ).
M(t)+B(t)=-S(t)-p k(t)O(t) +i(t)B(t)

(1)

S=P(T+pK-C-A)

(2)

K=A-aK-0

(3)

Nominal magnitudes are awkward to interpret when the general price level varies, and
even for real flows and stocks it is often hard to get a good sense of magnitude when the real
economy is growing. It is therefore helpful to rewrite the budget identity in ( 1) in terms of stocks
and flows as proportions of GDP. Let Y denote real GDP. For stocks and flows, a lower case
character represents the corresponding upper case character as a proportion of GDP, that is,
m=W(PY), b=Bl(PY), s=S/(PY), c=CIY, a=A/Y, 'C=TIY, ro =fJ.IY and k=KIY. We also define
the instantaneous rate of inflation , re =P/P, the instantaneous growth rate of real GDP, y =Yf

,

and the instantaneous real rate of interest r=i-1t. The increase in the nominal stock of base
money,

.M,

will be referred to as seigniorage, and we define ~ =M and cr=I:/(PY). Changing

from money to real GDP as the numeraire, we can rewrite identities (1), (2) and (3) as follows:
k

b=(r-y)b-s- Lw -a

(4)

s=t+pk-c-a

(5)

w =a-(y +6)k-k

(6)

p

For notational simplicity, we define the adjusted primary surplus-GDP ratio,
privatization proceeds inclusive primary surplus-GDP ratio:

8

S

,

to be the
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(7)

The net tangible (that is financial and physical) non-monetary liabilities of the government, D,
henceforth referred to as the government's net liabilities , are its interest-bearing debt minus the
value of its physical assets (at current reproduction cost), that is D=B-PK and d=D/(PK)=b-k.
The evolution of the ratio of the government's net liabilities is therefore governed by:

k

d=(r-y )d-(t: -c) +[r-(p -~)]k+(l -L )<.t> -a

(8)

p

The conventional current or consumption account primary surplus of the government as a fraction
of GDP, sc· is defined by
(9a)

We define the adjusted current primary surplus s ca to be

(9b)

The dynamics of the government's net liabilities-GDP ratio can now be written compactly as in
equation (10).

(10)

The rate of change of the government's'net liabilities-GDP ratio is therefore driven by a first
order linear differential equation whose homogeneous part is the product of the existing net
liabilities-GDP ratio and the excess of the current real interest rate over the current growth rate
of real GDP. The forcing variable is minus the sum of the adjusted current primary surplus and
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government seigniorage (both as fractions of GDP).
While individual administrations may be short-lived, it is not unreasonable to treat the
institution of government as effectively infinite-lived 13 . Assuming that current and future
governments do not default on the debt they inherit and/or incur, the solvency constraint of this

infinite-lived institution of government is given in equation (I la) for the budget identity (4) and
in equation (I lb) for the budget identity (10).

V

-f[r(u)-y(u)]du

fun b(v)e '

~o

(lla)

~o

(llb)

v➔ oo

V

-f[r(u)-y(u)]du

fun d(v)e '
v➔ oo

What equations (lla,b) assert is that, in the long run, the growth rate of the debt (the net
liabilities) must be less than the rate of interest. Ponzi finance is therefore ruled out. Conditions
(lla,b) make sense only if the long-run interest rate is not less than the long-run growth rate. If
the outstanding stock of public debt (net liabilities) is positive, this then means that "on average"
the government will have to run primary surpluses or use seigniorage 14in the future. While for
extended periods of calendar time, ex-post real rates of interest have been negative and well
below the rate of growth of the real economy, a world in which such a state of affairs was
permanent would be a strange place in which scarcity had, in some fundamental sense,
disappeared. If conditions (1 la,b) hold, the present value budget constraint of the government
is as given in (12a) for equation (4) and in (12b) for equation (10).
v

-f[r(u)-y(u)]du

b(t)s:fun { [sa(z)+a(z)]e '
v ➔ oo

dzs:0

(12a)

8
(12b)

v-00
If, given the outstanding debt and the planned or expected primary surpluses of the government,

the inequalities (12a,b) are violated, a good sense of the permanent fiscal correction, as a
proportion of GDP, that will be required if debt repudiation or default is to be avoided, is given
by the permanent primary gaps g\ and gdt defined in (13a,b) (see Buiter [1983, 1985], Blanchard
[1990] and Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor [1990])

.
8t =lim [{ e '

i-1 [
dz b(t)-lim {[sa(v)+a(v)]e '

v -f[r(u)-y(u)]du

b

v

\I

v-00

i-1 [
dz d(t)-lim

v -f[r(u)-y(u)]du

[f
v-co

t

(13a)

v -/[r(u)-y(u)]du

e'

f
v

-f[r(u)-y(u)]du

[sc0(v)+a(v)]e '

\I

]

dz

(13b)

v-co

v-00

The term lim

]

dz

v-00

.
8t =lim [{ e '
d

-f[r(u)-y(u)]du

i-1

dz

is the long-run real rate of interest, r , minus the long-run

growth rate of real GDP, y_.

fe'

v -/[r(u)-y(u)]du

The term

lim

v-co

[

t

i-l lim J[sa(v)+a(v)]e '
v

dz

t

v-co

-/[r(u)-y(u)]du

d

·

is that constant value of the
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primary surplus plus seigniorage as a proportion of GDP, s,4 +a,, say, whose present discounted
value is the same as the present discounted value of the sequence of primary surpluses plus
seigniorage as proportions of GDP that are actually expected or planned to prevail in the future.
We shall refer to this as the planned permanent primary surplus plus seigniorage to GDP ratio.
The term (r.-i)b(t) or (r-:t,)d(t)will be referred to as the required permanent primary surplus
plus seigniorage to GDP ratio. Equations (13a,b) can therefore be rewritten rather more
transparently as equations (14ab): the permanent primary gap is the excess of the required over
the planned permanent primary surplus plus seigniorage to GDP ratio.
(14a)

(14b)

IV. Why care about the public debt?
There are four reasons why the public debt matters for real economic performance. The
first is the argument that a larger stock of public debt makes default or debt repudiation more
likely. The second is the proposition, most recently associated with Sargent and Wallace [I 981],
that a larger debt and/or a larger deficit imply eventually higher monetary growth and inflation.
The third is the old argument that deficit financing leads to "financial crowding out". It reduces
national saving and thus domestic capital formation and/or net foreign investment. The fourth
argument points to reasons why the ability of governments run unbalanced budgets may be
useful. There is a Keynesian variant, stressing the stabilizing properties of countercyclical fiscal
deficits and a new classical variant which extols the virtues of tax (rate) smoothing in the face
of temporary variations the tax base or in public expenditures when all available tax instruments
are distortionary. We shall deal with them in tum.

!V.1 Government debt default and the permanent primacy gap.

Except in countries where the vast majority of the population lives on the edge of

starvation, government debt default is always a policy choice, rather than something forced on
a powerless government by unfavorable circumstances that leave it no other option. In other
words, the decision to default generally reflects willingness to pay rather than ability to pay.
There is of course an upper bound on the magnitude of the primary surpluses even the most
ruthless and efficient government can squeeze out of its tax payers and out of the beneficiaries
from its spending programs, without seriously endangering its chances for political survival. At
that point the distinction between willingness to pay and ability to pay ceases to be very
meaningful.
The government has many instruments at its disposal for influencing the real value of its
debt, other than de Jure repudiation or a formal capital levy on government debt holders. With
long-maturity nominal debt, an unexpected increase in long nominal interest rates (brought about,
say, by the unanticipated adoption of more inflationary current and anticipated future policies)
will cause an unexpected decline in the real market value of the debt, even absent any default
risk. Long real interest rates too can be influenced by current and anticipated future government
policies 15 • Unexpected increases in the taxation of interest income or capital gains can also be
used to inflict capital losses on government debt holders. Even here, however, the political
consensus is unlikely to tolerate wild experiments.
While de Jure or defacto default has been and continues to be an important policy issue
in many developing countries, the political cost-benefit calculus of formal debt repudiation in the
USA is extremely unfavorable to this option. It would not be politically survivable. In addition,
the permanent fiscal correction required to guarantee solvency is, as shown below, rather small.
We can use equations (14a,b) to make some back-of-the-envelope calculations about the
minimal permanent increase in the primary surplus-GDP ratio (plus the seigniorage-GDP ratio)
that is required to make the US budgetary position sustainable, in the sense of consistent with
government solvency.

Solvency of course only relates to the feasibility rather than to the

optimality of budgetary policies, but even feasibility is not something to be sneezed at when the
extrapolation of current patterns of behavior of public spending and revenue raising suggests you
haven't got it.
To calculate the permanent primary gap for the US Federal or General government, we
need the following inputs: (1) an estimate of the excess of the long-run rate of interest over the
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long-run growth rate of GDP, r - y_ ; (2) the initial debt-GDP ratio (b(t) or d(t) ) and (3) an
estimate of the planned or expected permanent primary deficit plus seigniorage (as a proportion
of GDP), s,C +a, or

The long-run interest rate and growth rate.
It is apparent from Figure 4 that the historical relationship between nominal interest rates

on the public debt and the ex-post growth rate of nominal GDP has not been a constant one in
the 40 years since the Korean War. Table 6 confirms this. The growth rate of nominal GNP
exceeds both the short and the long nominal interest rates on Federal government debt until the
end of the 1970's. Since 1980, the average short rate has exceeded the average growth rate of
nominal GDP by 1.12 percentage points per annum. For the long rate, the excess has been 3.03
percentage points per annum.
It is hard to be confident about any prediction concerning the relationship between interest

rates and growth rates in the future. I would be inclined to take the post-1980 observations as
a better guide to the future than the earlier ones. This reflects my view that both the high real
growth rates and the low real interest rates of the first thirty-plus years following World War
II were exceptional and are most unlikely to be repeated. Unless a major lasting recession
intervenes, the coming decades are likely to be characterized by low global saving propensities
and ambitious global investment plans. High real interest rates would be the equilibrium outcome.
In any case, since the cost associated with over-estimating

r - y_ are likely to be lower than the

cost of underestimating it, I believe that prudence calls for working with a one or two percentage
points per annum number for r - y_.
The economic assumptions made by the Clinton Administration (A Vision of Change for
America [I 993, Table 3-2]) are reproduced below in Table 7. For the next 6 years the short
nominal interest rate is assumed to be on average 1.15% below the growth rate of nominal GDP
while the long rate of interest is assumed to be on average 0.8% above the growth rate of
nominal GDP. All three series are likely to prove to be too low; in addition, the assumed
relationship between the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate and the growth rate of nominal GDP
represents either a pious hope or the unwarranted extrapolation of an unsustainably low US short

12
term interest rate at the beginning of an economic recovery.

Note that the actual interest

payments made in the next few years on the public debt are to a large extent predetermined by
the existing maturity structure of the debt. With an average maturity of just under six years, the
US Federal debt might seem a natural candidate for a major open market operation, retiring long
dated debt and replacing it with short-dated instruments. Whether such a debt conversion can be
implemented on a voluntary basis at anything like the current short-long yield differentials is an
open question.
The initial debt-GDP ratio.

I shall use two benchmark figures for the initial debt-GDP ratio. The first is 65% of
annual GDP at the end of 1992 for the non-monetary net debt of the Federal government,
including the present value of accrued pension obligations to Federal employees. As can be seen
from Figure 2, this ratio was just below 60% of GDP at the end of 1989, and rising. The second
is 45% of annual GDP at the end of 1992 for general government net non-monetary debt,
excluding the present value of accrued pension obligations to Federal, State and Local
government employees. At the end of 1991, this stood at 42.6% of GDP.

Tire required permanent primary surplus.
If the excess of the long-run interest rate over the long-run growth rate is as much as 2

percentage points per annum (which may well be generous since it is the after-tax rate of interest
that matters), then in order to achieve solvency, the consolidated US Federal government sector
and central bank (henceforth the Federal government) needs to run a permanent primary surplus
plus seigniorage of no less than 1.3% of GDP. Assuming (perhaps somewhat conservatively,
since in 1991 seigniorage was 0.42% of GDP) a permanent share of seigniorage in GDP of
0.25%, the required permanent Federal government primary surplus is 1.05% of GDP.
If the excess of the long-run interest rate over the long-run growth rate is only 1% per

annum, the required permanent Federal government primary surplus plus seigniorage goes down
to 0.65% of GDP and the required permanent Federal government primary surplus to 0.40% of
GDP 16•

If the long-run interest rate equals the long-run growth rate, the required Federal

permanent primary surplus plus seigniorage goes down to zero, and the required permanent
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primary surplus is -0.25% of GDP. Table 8a summarizes these assumptions and calculations.
Note that these are the minimal permanent primary surpluses required for solvency. Other
considerations (such as the wish to avoid financial crowding out) may motivate a larger
permanent primary surplus.
As regards the general government, the required permanent pnmary surplus plus
seigniorage equals 0.90% of GDP when the excess of the long-run interest rate over the long-run
growth rate is two percent per annum, 0.45% of GDP when the excess is one percent per annum
and zero when the long-run interest rate equals the long-run growth rate. The assumptions and
calculations for this case are summarized in Table 8b.
Note that the initial Federal government debt-GDP ratio of 65% (but not the initial
General government debt-GDP ratio of 45%) includes the present discounted value of accrued
Federal employee pension rights. Following Bohn [1992], the correct measure for current outlays
under accrual accounting for pension liabilities is the value of newly-accruing pension obligations
rather than the current payments to beneficiaries. Bohn goes on to show that, since the early
seventies, pension outlays to current beneficiaries have exceeded newly-accruing liabilities. 17
The last year for which Bohn provides a "pension outlays correction" is 1989; it adds $30.9
billion to the conventionally measured primary surplus, that is, 0.60% of the 1989 GDP. In the
absence of more up-to-date information, I apply the same 0.60% of GDP as the appropriate
"pension outlays correction" in 1992.

TJ,e planned permanent primary surplus

mu/,

tire primary gap.

Rather than attempting the impossible by estimating the present discounted value of the
infinite sequence of all future planned primary surpluses, I shall merely attempt to purge the
current primary surplus of its cyclical component.
The 1992 general government primary surplus of -2.5% of GDP (according to the
OECD[l992] estimate;-2.1% of GDP according to the 0MB [1993] estimate), was generated by
an economy that is still operating significantly below capacity. If a return to normal capacity
utilization is possible without additional discretionary fiscal measures that wouldfurther raise the

deficit, then the current primary deficit overstates the long-run average primary deficit under
unchanged fiscal policy. The OECD estimates that the cyclically adjusted primary deficit of the

14
General government increased by only 0.2% of GDP in 1991 and by 0.4% of GDP in 1992

18

•

Table 5 shows that the OECD measure of the actual General government primary deficit
increased by 0.7% of GDP in 1991 and 1.4% of GDP in 1992. If 1990 is a year for which no
cyclical correction is required, then the cyclically corrected General government primary deficit
in 1992 was 1.0% of GDP.
Identifying the planned permanent primary surplus with the cyclically corrected current
primary surplus of 1992 gives us, for the General government, the permanent primary gaps shown
in lines (10) and (11) of Table 8b. They range from a low of 0.35% of GDP (when the long-run
interest rate equals the long-run growth rate and the lower O:MB[l993] figure for the 1992 actual
General government primary deficit is used) to a high of 1.65% of GDP (when the long-run
interest rate is two percentage points higher than the long-run growth rate and the higher
OECD[l 992] figure for the actual 1992 General government primary deficit is used) 19•
Another way of looking at these figures is to note that the long-run real interest rate
would have to be 1.15% below the long-run growth rate in order for the permanent primary gap
to vanish when the OECD estimate of the current primary surplus is used. When the 0MB
estimate of the current primary deficit is used the long-run interest rate must be 0.53% below
the long-run growth rate for the permanent primary gap to equal zero.

These estimates of

required permanent corrections are not negligible, but neither do they seem to be the stuff out
of which crises ought to be made in a country as affluent as the USA.
As regards the Federal government, the 1992 actual primary deficit was 1.5% of GDP.
If the entire 1.5% of GDP cyclical correction for the general government is attributed to the

Federal government (a likely overestimate of the Federal cyclical correction), then the 1992
cyclically corrected Federal non-interest budget would have been balanced. In addition, as noted
earlier, the Federal debt figure includes an estimate of accrued Federal employee pension rights
based on Bohn [1992] 20 . The associated correction to the pension outlays in the primary balance
is assumed to raise the primary surplus by 0.60% of GDP in 1992. Table 8a shows the Federal
permanent primary gap to be -0.86% of GDP when r_-y equals 0% , -0.21 % of GDP when r.-'J.
equals 1% and 0.44% of GDP when r_-y equals 2% .
Bohm's calculations of the present discounted value of accrued pension rights and of the
current pension outlays correction did, inevitably, require a number of fairly arbitrary assumptions
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to be made. In addition, my "adjustments" of his 1989 data to get figures for 1992 were
extremely simplistic.

The Federal permanent primary gap calculations in Table 8a should

therefore be treated with caution.
As inspection of the bottom line of Table 9 below indicates, the recent budgetary
proposals submitted by the Clinton administration contain planned Federal deficit reductions
that are insufficient to produce a sustainable debt-deficit path if we go by the General government
calculations of Table 8b. By this I mean that if the average cyclically corrected primary surplus
planned for the Federal government for the period 1993-98 (equal to 0.13% of G~P, using the
last line of Table 9) were to be maintained indefinitely and if the 1992 value of the State and
Local government primary surplus (equal to -0.5% of GDP according to Table 4) were to be
maintained indefinitely, then the

General government's solvency constraint would not be

satisfied. The planned permanent General government primary surplus under the Clinton budget
proposal would be -0.37% of GDP. Comparing this with line 5 of Table 8b yields a planned
permanent primary gap for the General government of between 0.12% of GDP (when r.-'1. equals
0 and 1.02% of GDP (when r.-'1. equals 2%). According to these calculations, the Clinton
proposals do not yet constitute a sustainable policy. Sooner or later, further tax increases or
spending cuts are required merely to en~ure government solvency.
If we take the Federal government calculations of Table 8a as our point of departure, the
picture looks rather rosier for the Clinton proposals. With a planned average cyclically corrected
Federal primary surplus for the period 1993-1998 of 0.13% of GDP, the permanent Federal
Primary gap would be -0.98% of GDP when r.-Y. equals 0, -0.33% of GDP when r.-Y. equals 1%
and 0.32% of GDP. when r.-Y. equals 2%. Again a larger pinch of salt should be applied to this
calculation than to the one for the General government.
Three final remarks on these permanent primary gap calculations. First, the method is
silent on the nature of the fiscal measures that should be taken to eliminate the gap; it only gives
the sum of the required spending cuts, tax increases and increased recourse to seigniorage.
Second, the method has nothing to say about the timing of the fiscal corrections.

At one

extreme, one could reduce the planned primary deficit immediately and at each future date by
the amount of the permanent primary gap. This would mean an immediate fiscal contraction that
could threaten the recovery unless a compensating relaxation of monetary policy or an (unlikely)
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boost to demand from the rest of the world were forthcoming. At the other extreme are the
proposals of those who for cyclical reasons propose immediate discretionary measures to
stimulate the economy. Their immediate impact would be to increase the fiscal deficit. Following
such an initial fiscal stimulus, the future permanent correction would of course need to be larger
that the one just calculated, since more the debt-GDP ratio will probably be rising while the
fiscal stimulus is in effect.
Finally, the cyclically corrected primary surplus may be a very poor indicator of the long
run average primary surplus if non-cyclical, structural changes in current outlays and receipts can
be anticipated. Demographic changes that alter the balance of inflows and outflows of the social
security budget are an obvious example. Contingent implicit liabilities arising from the precarious
state of part of the financial system are another. Perhaps even more important in the US context
is the expected growth, under current laws, regulations and practice, of Federal outlays for
Medicare and Medicaid.

IV.2 Debt, deficits and inflauon.

There is an upper bound on the real resources the government can appropriate through
seigniorage. Consider equation (15) which rewrites cr, seigniorage as a fraction of GDP in a
number of ways.

µ =M is the proportional rate of growth of the nominal stock of base money.
M

a=M/(PY)

=Th+(1t +y )m

(15)

Sooner or later , a sustained higher rate of monetary growth µ will lead to higher inflation.
A higher ( expected) rate of inflation will tend to reduce the demand for real money balances,
both directly and by raising nominal interest rates and the expected rate of depreciation of the
domestic currency. Thus when the long-run expected value ofµ (the inflation tax rate) is raised,
m, (the inflation tax base), will tend to decline. There is reasonably strong empirical ·evidence
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that there is a long-run "seigniorage Laffer curve": at high rates of inflation, the (negative)
elasticity of money demand with respect to the rate of inflation becomes greater than one in
absolute value, and further increases in the rates of monetary growth and inflation will actually
reduce real seigniorage revenue.
In the USA today, seigniorage is a negligible source of government revenue, as Figure

3 makes clear. The base money stock is less than 6% of annual GDP since 1975 (an annual
income velocity of circulation of base money of almost 17). The change in the nominal stock
of base money has not exceeded 0.5% of GDP since 1960.
In what sense do higher deficits or a larger debt imply higher inflation? From equation

(8), the proportional rate of growth of the monetary base µ, is given by
(16)

where V

= PY/M

is the income velocity of circulation of base money. Consider a long-run

stationary equilibrium with the net debt-GDP ratio constant at .d , a constant rate of inflation 2k
and constant values of pk/p and of ro. The public sector capital stock-GDP ratio is also constant
at k- While the short-run relationship between the rate of growth of any monetary aggregate and
the rate of inflation remains one of economics' best kept mysteries, it is not unreasonable to
postulate that the long-run rate of inflation equals the long-run growth rate of base money, g,
minus the long-run growth rate of GDP, y_. This implies

(17)

If we are willing to assume that the long-run real interest rate and the long-run growth rate of
real GDP are independent of the rates of monetary growth and inflation (the traditional monetarist
or classical position), then it is clear from (17) that the deficit concept that drives long-run
monetary growth and inflation is rather different from the conventional government deficit-GDP
ratio. Holding constant velocity, the deficit that governs long-run monetary growth is the
government's inflotion-and-rem-growtli-co"ected adjusted c""ent deficit as a fraction of GDP.
The interest rate applied to the net debt of the government (the capital stock valued at current
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reproduction cost is subtracted from the government's interest-bearing liabilities) is the real
interest rate minus the growth rate of real GDP, a number certain to be much lower than the
nominal interest rate that figures in the conventional government deficit.

If the net cash rate of return to the government on the public sector capital stock is the
same as the real rate of interest (p-o=r) and the privatization value of public sector capital equals
its current reproduction cost (pk= p ), then the only other item in the corrected deficit is the
current primary deficit as a fraction of GDP, -sc = c-'t. It is, however, useful to look at other,
possibly more realistic benchmark cases.
Consider, e.g. the case where p = 0, and pk= 0, that is, the government does not get any
gross cash income, directly or indirectly, from the operation of its capital stock in the public
sector and public sector capital has no value outside the public sector. In that case equation (17)
becomes
1t

"'fl -s.:.. +a +(r-x)hl-x

(18)

Note that the deficit concept driving long-run inflation (given velocity), -s.:..+a+(r-x)b.
, is, except for the inflation and real growth corrections, much more like the conventional
government financial deficit. The inflation-and-real-growth-corrected interest rate is now applied
to the government's stock of interest-bearing liabilities. The government capital stock is no longer
subtracted from its debt. The appropriate primary deficit is no longer the current primary deficit,
-sC, but the conventional primary deficit inclusive of gross domestic capital formation by the
government, -s=-sc+a.
At the beginning of this subsection, there was an allusion to the fact that the velocity of
circulation of base money is likely to be an increasing function of the expected rate of inflation.
Equating actual and expected inflation in steady state, equation (17) and the velocity function can
be used as a rudimentary model of the long-run relationship between the budget and the rate of
inflation (see e.g. Anand and van Wijnbergen [1989] and Buiter [1990]).
The post-1959 American data suggest that it is actually impossible to raise the steady-state
seigniorage revenue GNP ratio much above its current (presumably non-steady state) paltry level.
This can be illustrated empirically as follows. I estimated a base money demand function in error-
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correction form, as shown in equation (19)

3

t:..Jn(M/P)=a. 0 +

L t1;+a.ifime+a.p(M/P)_ +a. lnY_ +a. E1t _ +a.si_ +e
i=l

1

3

1

4

1

1

(l 9 )

M is the FRB's senes for the monetary base corrected for changes in reserve
requirements; Pis the GNP deflator, Y real GNP, i the three month US Treasury Bill Rate in the
secondary market and

1t

the proportional rate of change of the GNP deflator21 • The Bi are

quarterly dummies and E is the conditional expectation operator.
The time trend was not significantly different from zero (a1=0). For estimation purposes,
the actual rate of inflation was substituted for the unobservable expected rate of inflation. Under
rational expectations, this creates an errors-in-variables problem, requiring the use of instrumental
variable estimation. For instruments I used the constant term, seasonal dummies and trend, all
regressors other than inflation, inflation lagged one and two quarters and the lagged value of the
Discount Rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The results are reported below as
equation (20) (the quarterly dummies are omitted). T-statistics are given below the estimated
values of the coefficients.

*****************************************************************

Sample range: 1959.4 -1992.1

4ln(M/P)=0.0257-0.0 630ln(M/P)+0.0527l nY~-0.74271t~-0.73 30i_ 1
(0.851) (4.358)
(6.419)
(5.868)
(5.038)

(20)

R2 : 0.92
Adjusted R2 : 0. 92
S.E. of regression: 0.0060
F-statistic: 208.23
Durbin-Watson statistic: 1.74

*****************************************************************

The restriction that the value of the coefficient on ln(MIP)_ 1 equals minus the value of the
coefficient on Iny_ 1 , was not rejected by the data. Imposing the restriction that <Xi+ a 3 = 0,
equation (21) was estimated (also using instrumental variables).
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*****************************************************************

Sample range: 1959.4 -1992.1

Aln (M/P) =-0. 0174-0. 0434 [ln (M/P) -lnY] _1 - 0. 74421t_ 1 -0. 6265i_ 1
(2. 893) (8. 458)
(5. 817)
(4. 605)

(21)

R2 :

0.92
Adjusted R2 : 0. 92
S.E. of regression: 0.0060
F-statistic: 240.36
Durbin-Watson statistic: 1.75

*****************************************************************
In steady state the growth rate of real money balances equals the growth rate of real GDP,
that is, dln(M/P)

= y. Equating the actual and expected rates of inflation and noting that i = r+1t,

the long-run base money demand function can be written as in equation (22).

(22)

In steady state, µ

= y + 7t,

so steady-state seigniorage can be written as
CJ= (7t

+ y)M/(PY)

The steady-state seigniorage maximizing rate of inflation 7tm is given by:

The inflation rate is a quarterly rate, so the annual rate of inflation that maximizes the long-run
share of seigniorage in GDP is approximately 12.7 percent minus the long-run annual growth
rate of real GDP. If we take the long-run annual growth rate of real output to be 3 percent per
annum, then the steady-state seigniorage revenue maximizing quarterly rate of inflation is 0.024
or just under 2.5 percent per quarter (9.7 percent per annum). Assuming the long-run real interest
rate to be 4 percent per annum (.01 per quarter), the maximal share of quarterly GNP that can
be extracted as seigniorage in steady state, ~' is then given by

~

= 0.0072 or 0.72 percent of

quarterly GNP. The steady-state seigniorage revenue maximizing ratio of base money to quarterly
GNP is 22.7 percent of GNP (a base money-annual GNP ratio of 5.7%).
These low numbers, which as regards seigniorage and the base money-GNP ratio are not
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too far from recent historical experience, are a reflection of the fact that the estimate of the semi
elasticity of the long-run demand for real money balances with respect to the annual rate of
inflation, -

!2

a 1(a 4 +a 5 )

,

is -7.9. This very large numerical value ensures that the highest point

of the long-run seigniorage Laffer curve is reached at a low rate of inflation and at low values
of the share of seigniorage in GNP.
These estimates of the semi-elasticity of long-run money demand with respect to the
annual inflation rate are much higher than those typically obtained for other countries, both
industrial and developing, for which semi-elasticities of -2.0, -1.5 or less have been recorded (see
e.g. Buiter [ 1985]). To make sure that improperly accounted for seasonality did not produce
spurious results, I re-estimated the identical specifications of the base money demand functions
using annual data. The unrestricted and restricted annual base money demand functions are as
given in equations (20') and (21 '). Note that the inflation rate and the interest rates here are
annualized rates and that the GNP flow is annual too.

*****************************************************************
Sample range: 1960-1991
Aln (M/P) =-0 .1216-0. 25981n (M/P) _1+0 .1950lnY_i-0. 74701L1-0. 5122i~l
(1.101) (3.112)
(3.867)
(6.063)
(2.770)

(20 I)

R2 : 0. 76

Adjusted R2 : 0. 72
S.E. of regression: 0.0126
F-statistic: 14.568
Durbin-Watson statistic: 2.04

*****************************************************************
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*****************************************************************

Sample range: 1960-1991

Aln (M/P) =-0. 2692-0 .1214 [ln (M/P) -lnY_1J -0. 65901t_1-0. 3614i_l
(3. 457) (4. 011)
(4. 589)
(2 .155)

(21 ')

R2 : 0.71
Adjusted R2 : 0. 68
S.E. of regression: 0.0135
F-statistic: 12.92
Durbin-Watson statistic: 2.09

*****************************************************************
The relationship between the quarterly and the annual estimates is as follows. Let mt

=

In¾, Pt = lnPt and Yt = lnYt where t indexes quarters. Assume the "primitive" behavioral
relationship is in terms of quarterly time units, as given in equation (23).
(23)

Recursive substitution using equation (23) yields (24).

3

3

i=O

i=O

mt-pt-(mt-4-pt_J= "oL (1 +cxi+[(l +cxz)4- l](mt-4-p1_J+cx3I; (1 +cxz)'.Yt-l-i

(24)

3
3
3
+cx4I; (l +cxi1tt-1-;+«sL (l +cxiit-1+;+ (1 +cxiet-I+i
i=O

i=O

L
i=O

The annual money stock data I use (from the Economic Report of the President [1993])
are daily averages. mt is just the daily average for the tth quarter. Similarly, the annual real money
stock for the year ending in period t is obtained by deflating the annual average nominal money
stock by the average price level of the year ending in quarter t. Pt is just the price level in the
tth quarter. Let

me°, the logarithm of the average nominal base money stock in the year ending

in quarter t, be the arithmetic average of the logarithm of the nominal base money stocks of the
4 quarters ending in quarter t. Also let

Pi° , the logarithm of the average price level in the year

ending in quarter t be the arithmetic average of the logarithm of the price levels in the four

23.
quarters ending in quarter t. Assume the proportional quarterly rate of growth of nominal base
money during each of the 4 quarters of the year ending in quarter t is constant at µ 1 , that is, m1_i
=

mt-i-I + µ 1 , i = 0,.. ,3. Assume likewise that the proportional quarterly rate of inflation during

each of the 4 quarters of the year ending in quarter t is constant at

= 0, ..3.

1t1

,

that is Pt-i

= Pt-i-I + 1t1 ,

i

Finally assume that real output during the 4 quarters ending in quarter t grows at the

constant quarterly rate y1 and that the quarterly nominal interest rate during the 4 quarters ending
in quarter t is constant at i1• Real output during the year ending in quarter t is denoted
(annual) nominal interest rate during the year ending in quarter tis denoted

i,°

y,° , the

and the (annual)

inflation rate during the year ending in quarter t is denoted re:. It follows that

a
3
mt =mt- 2 I-Lt

a
3
Pt =pt- rct

2

y,°=4yt-6Yt
.a 4·
lt = lt

rc:=4rct
The annual change in the logarithm of the real base money stock implied by the quarterly
model of equation (23) is given in equations (25) and (26a through f)

(25)

3

«~=«o:E (1 +«i

(26a)

i=O

(26b)
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(26c)

(26d)

(26e)

(26f)

Even if the error terms in equations (23) and (25) have been handled properly for
estimation and hypothesis testing, the a~I coefficients in (25) will not, in general, be the same
as (or even close to) the a. coefficients in (23 ). It so happens that for the values of the a.
I
I
coefficients estimated using the quarterly equations (20) and (21), the a~I coefficients are rather
similar to the corresponding ai coefficients. (Note that the closer a 2 is to zero, the closer a~ is
I
to a.I , with strict equality when a 2 = 0).
For instance, if a 2 = -0.0630 (as in the quarterly equation (20)), then (1 +a ) 4 - 1=-0.2292
2
and

L (1 +al= 3.638. The value of a; expected on the basis of a

2

= -0.0630 is therefore -

i=O

0.2292, close to the estimate in equation (20') of -0.2598. Similarly the value of

«; expected on

the basis of the quarterly estimates of a 2 and a 3 is 0.0479 (against an estimate based on annual
data of 0.1950); the expected value of«: is -0.6755 (against an estimate of-0.7470; the expected
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value of«; is o.6667 (against an estimate of-0.5122); the expected value of the annual constant
term a~, is 0.0935 (against an estimate of -0.1216). However, if Et is white noise, there is no
reason to believe that e0 should have a zero mean, so the estimated constant term in a regression
t
'

with annual data need not be a consistent estimate of
If a.2 = -a.3 = -0.0434 (as in the quarterly equation (21)), then «; in the annual equation
(18'), should equal -0.1626. The point estimate of «; in (21') is in fact -0.1214, which is not
3

significantly different from -0.1626. For a.2

= -0.0434,

L (1 +ai

= 3.747, making for

i=O

theoretically expected values of the a~I that are (with the exception of the constant term) even
3

closer to the corresponding ai. When a.2 = -0.5, «; = -0.9375, and

L (1 +a i = 1.87. In this case
2

i=O

the theoretically expected values of the a~ , i=3,4,5 are less that half of the corresponding ai.·
Note also that even if <Xi

= -a.3 , it will only be approximately true that

«;=-a; for values of

<Xi close to zero. The restriction that «;=-«; is in fact rejected by the annual data at standard
significance levels, even though the restriction a.2

= - a.3 is not rejected by the quarterly data.

The value of <Xi implied by the estimate of -0.2598 for «; given in equation (20), is 0.0725, not too far from the estimate for a.2 in equation (20) of -0.0630. Equation (21 ') implies
an estimate for <Xi (=-a.3) of -0.0318, not that different from the estimate in equation (21) of .0434. Equation (21 ') also implies the following estimates for the remaining ai (the estimates
from equation (21) are reproduced in parentheses): a.0
CX.4 =

= -0.0718 (-0.0174);

-0.6173 (-.7442); CX.5= -0.3385 (-0.6265).
The estimate of the semi-elasticity of long-run money demand with respect to the annual
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rate of inflation

(-! (« 4 +«s)
4

) obtained from equation (21 ') is -7.5, very close to the estimate

«2

of -7.9 obtained from the quarterly data. The long-run seigniorage revenue maximizing annual
rate of inflation derived from the annual estimates is 10.3 percent per annum, against the
estimate of 9. 7 percent per annum obtained from the quarterly data. The associated money base
GNP ratio is 3.4 percent of GNP, so long-run seigniorage cannot exceed 0.45 percent of GNP.
If one were to misinterpret the «~I as cxi, the steady-state seigniorage revenue maximizing annual
inflation rate, annual debt-GNP ratio and seigniorage-GNP ratio would be 8.9% p.a., 3.6% of
GNP and 0.42% of GNP respectively. No harm would come from this error, because

CX2

is very

close to zero.
The matching of the quarterly and the annual estimates of course makes sense only if the
disturbance terms in equations (23) and (25) have been treated properly in estimation and
hypothesis testing.
These estimates of the long-run seigniorage Laffer curve, which are consistent with the
view that the Fed has acted as if it wanted to maximize the steady-state share of seigniorage in
GNP, should be taken with a pinch of salt. 22 It should also be noted that seigniorage is but one
of the inflation tax instruments. The long-run seigniorage considered here can be interpreted as
the steady state anticipated inflation tax. It is of course possible for a government operating in
real time to use the anticipated but non-steady state inflation tax to obtain seigniorage revenues
in excess of cr1". In addition, it can use unanticipated inflation as a means of reducing the real
value of its non-monetary but nominally denominated long-dated interest-bearing liabilities. It
nevertheless seems unlikely that seigniorage revenue considerations play a major role in
explaining the vagaries of the US government budget deficit.
This conclusion is reinforced by the realization that the consolidation of the accounts of
the General government sector and the Fed does not imply that these agencies are also
behaviorally integrated. The Fed is among the more independent central banks in the industrial
world, as the avid courtship of Mr. Greenspan by the Clinton administration testifies. Unless the
Fed is thought to be about to acquire serious short-run seigniorage objectives of its own (surely

27
an unlikely prospect), it is doubtful that the Congress or the Administration could bring enough
pressure to bear on the Fed to induce it to seek inflation tax revenues significantly in excess of
their current levels.

IV.3 Debt financing, intergenerational redistribution and financial crowding out.

When the government is solvent, the face value of the outstanding stock of debt of the
consolidated general government and central bank is (less than or) equal to the present discounted
value of the sum of future primary (non-interest) surpluses of the government and seigniorage.
When we wish to evaluate the consequences of, say, an increase in the stock of public debt, we
have to be clear about the alternative fiscal-financial-monetary scenarios we are comparing, that
is, about the counterfactual to the original contingent sequences of revenues, expenditures and
monetary financing. If in the alternative scenario the stock of debt in period t is higher by 1$
than in the baseline scenario, we know that the alternative scenario must in addition contain
further counterpart differences from the baseline streams of future government revenues, non
interest outlays and/or seigniorage, that sum to 1$ in present discounted value.

The answer

clearly will be different if lower debt today in the baseline scenario is associated with lower
future income taxes, higher future unemployment benefits, increased public sector spending on
R&D or reductions in future seigniorage.
The simplest comparison is one between two paths of debt, taxes, public expenditure and
seigniorage that differ only in the initial stocks of public debt and in the future paths of taxes and
transfers. Exhaustive public expenditure programs are assumed identical along the two paths, both
in magnitude and in composition and so are the paths of seigniorage. Only taxes and transfer
payments differ between the two scenarios, and the comparison is further simplified by restricting
taxes and transfers to be lump-sum 23 •
Under these conditions, the low and high low initial debt paths will differ only to the
extent that alternative debt and tax-transfer schemes redistribute resources between heterogeneous
economic agents (Buiter [1991]). The key heterogeneity concerns the marginal propensities to
spend out of current income, lifetime resources and financial wealth. Higher debt today implies
(holding constant current and future exhaustive spending and seigniorage, and at given current
and future interest rates and wage rates) a higher present discounted value of future taxes net of
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transfers. If those who pay the future higher taxes or receive the future lower transfer payments
are not the same as those who would have been taxed today (or who would have had their
transfer payments reduced today) should the additional 1$ of debt not have been issued,
redistribution takes place.
Financing through borrowing instead of through current taxation permits taxes to be
postponed. Consider the simplest possible tax regime in which lump-sum taxes net of transfers
are age-independent. The substitution of debt financing for current tax financing will
unambiguously redistribute resources from the young to the old and from future generations yet
to be born to those generations currently alive with whom they will overlap. The magnitude of
the redistribution will be greater the longer the period for which taxes are postponed. This
redistribution therefore goes from people with a high marginal saving rate to people with a low
marginal saving rate.
At given relative prices, including intertemporal relative prices such as interest rates, this
intergenerational redistribution raises aggregate private consumption demand.

In a closed

economy with full employment, this raises real rates of interest and "crowds out" or displaces
interest-sensitive forms of expenditure such as private capital formation. In an open economy
with international capital mobility, some or all of the increased private consumption demand may
spill over into an increase in the current account deficit of the balance of payments. In an
economy with Keynesian unemployment of productive resources, real economic activity may
expand as productive slack is taken up. Any financial crowding out of private investment that
occurs under conditions of Keynesian underemployment and excess capacity reflects a policy

choice: with expansionary monetary policy the expansion of output could take place at a constant
level of nominal and real interest rates.
While the actual US tax-transfer system is considerably more complicated than the age
independent scheme used in our example, it remains true that the substitution of borrowing for
current tax financing, that is, the postponement of taxes, will redistribute from the young to the
old and from future towards current generations.

In an influential paper, Robert Barro [1974], formalizing an argument made first by
Ricardo, argued that the primafacie patently unrealistic picture of a government debt owner who
is also the only person ever paying taxes to service that debt, may in fact be a reasonable first
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approximation to reality. If there is intergenerational caring and if there is an initial equilibrium
in which voluntary intergenerational transfers (bequests or child-to-parent gifts) occur among all
successive generations, then government attempts to achieve involuntary intergenerational
redistribution through the tax-transfer-public debt mechanism will be offset and neutralized by
changes in private voluntary intergenerational transfers in the opposite direction.
Note that there always exists a scale of government intergenerational redistribution large
enough to render the private sector incapable of neutralizing it. For instance, since negative
bequests are ruled out, the government can always increase the scale of its redistribution from
the old to the young to the point where the non-negativity constraint on bequests from the old
to the young becomes binding, no matter what the initial (positive) magnitude of the bequests.
The debt-neutrality or Ricardian equivalence proposition would then fail. How well the US
economy is characterized by a gigantic intergenerational daisy chain is of course an empirical
issue. Most recent surveys conclude that while debt-neutrality may be an interesting theoretical
ideal-type, it is not an empirically valid proposition (see e.g. Bernheim [19871).

Financial

crowding out remains a concern, especially in an economy with a saving rate as low as the USA.
A quite different proposition about the irrelevance of public debt and deficits has been
advanced by Larry Kotlikoff (see e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987], Kotlikoff [1989] and
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff [19911). The overlapping generations (OLG) structure without
operative intergenerational gift and bequest motives favored in these contributions, does have the
implication that intergenerational redistribution achieved, for instance, through unbalanced
government budgets, will affect aggregate consumption, as argued earlier.

Kotlikoff argues,

however, that the same redistribution can always be achieved in an (infinite) variety of ways,
including scenarios without debt and deficits, that is, with permanently balanced government
budgets. More generally it is without economic significance, whether a particular payment from
(to). the government to (from) a household is labeled a payment of interest on an existing
government (household) liability or a current transfer (tax) payment.
While there exist rarified economic models in which Kotlikoff's propositions are correct,
for interesting classes of models it represents a misleading half-truth.
Certain special cases of Kotlikoff's argument are familiar. The issuing of debt serviced
with taxes on the young will redistribute resources from the young to the old. Exactly the same
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redistribution can be achieved with a balanced-budget, pay-as-you go or unfunded social security
retirement scheme in which contributions by the working young are paid out as retirement
benefits to the old. Kotlikoff generalizes this example in an attempt to show that there is no
meaningful distinction between debt, taxes and transfers or between current transactions and
capital or financing transactions. All that matters is the present discounted value of the current
and future contingent net cash (strictly speaking net resource) flows between members of different
24
generations and the government, summarized in the "generational accounts" • Standard

government debt is a claim to a sequence of future payments by the government. How is this
different from the claim to future payments by the government encoded in current social security
legislation? Likewise, anticipated future wage income taxes can be seen as a contingent claim
on my future earnings owned by the government; this government asset can be set against its
conventional liabilities. Why do we label some of these payments and receipts (taxes, transfers
and interest) as "current" or "above the line" and others as "financing" or "capital" or "below the
line"?
I accept the proposition that, with forward-looking private consumers, investors and
entrepreneurs, anticipated future taxes, transfers payments, benefit entitlements and subsidies all
may influence current consumption, labor supply, portfolio selection and capital formation. This
is not the same, however, as accepting the proposition that giving me a government bond worth
1$ will affect my consumption behavior in the same way as would a matching increase in my
anticipated future social security benefits, that is, a future stream of benefit increases with a
present value of 1$, when discounted at the government's borrowing rate. This non-equivalence
holds even if there is no aggregate risk and the government borrows at the riskless rate.

It is true that with completely unrestricted lump-sum taxes and transfers and in the
presence of a complete set of contingent markets, public debt is redundant. Any intergenerational
redistribution (and intergenerational insurance) that can be achieved with non-zero debt and
unbalanced government budgets can also be achieved with zero debt and a permanently balanced
government budget (see Wallace [1981], Chamley andPolemarchakis [1984], Sargent [1987] and
Buiter and Kietzer [1992]). Without intra-generational heterogeneity and holding constant the
government's exhaustive spending program, the intergenerational accounts, giving for each
generation the present discounted value of current and future tax payments net of transfer
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receipts, provide all the information needed to evaluate the impact of government fiscal-financial
actions on private behavior. To state it like this is, of course, to underline the serious limitations
of the debt-is-redundant proposition and the proposition that the generational accounts provided
a sufficient statistic for the impact of fiscal policy on aggregate consumption demand. Buiter and
Kietzer [1992] show, that if there are restrictions on the government's ability to use lump-sum
taxes and transfer payments in a state-, time- and generation-contingent manner, then the ability
to unbalance the budget allows the government to support equilibria that could not be supported
with a permanently balanced budget: for better or worse, public debt matters. Note that in the
model of Buiter and Kietzer, the generational accounts still are a sufficient statistic for the effects
of fiscal-financial policy 25 ; however, with unbalanced budgets the set of generational accounts
that can be supported as equilibria will be richer.
The reason for the sufficiency of the generational accounts 1s that there are no
distortionary taxes and that markets are complete 26 ; specifically, there are no liquidity constraints
or current-disposable-income constraints on private spending, and future labor income as well as
transfers net of taxes provide perfect collateral for borrowing to finance current spending.
The simple key to understanding the role of public debt and deficits is to recognize that
practically useful dynamic macromodels should have the following two properties: (I) the
inherited stock of public debt constrains government behavior and (2) the ability to unbalance
current and future budget deficits expands the government's choice set and permits, in principle,
superior allocations to be supported

27

.

Government and private sector decision making must be seen as sequential. Governments
and households re-optimize (or re-satisfice) period- by- period.

Plans, hopes, fears and

expectations concerning the future are imperfect substitutes for binding forward contracts
transacted once-and-for-all in the Grand Arrow-Debreu Market at the beginning of time. OLG
models are helpful here, because, unlike representative agent models, they preclude the one-shot
equilibrium interpretation and implementation of the Arrow-Debreu model 28 • Markets will have
to re-open when new generations come on board. In addition, many contingent future actions of
the government cannot be contracted for at all. Government liabilities are those future contingent
government payments that the government has credibly committed itself to. Government debt is
the subset of government liabilities that was acquired voluntarily by the owners of these liabilities
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(it may but need not be marketable). Government transfer payments and subsidies are contingent
future government payments that remain discretionary, that is, to which the government is not
credibly committed. At time t, they remain subject to choice. With sequential decision making,
the distinction between those actions that are constrained and those that remain discretionary
matters. The entire literature on the time-inconsistency of optimal plans derives from this feature.
In this view, at a point in time, the outstanding stock of debt, because it represents a credible
commitment by the government to make certain (possibly contingent) future payments to the debt
holders, constrains current and future taxes and transfer payments and exhaustive spending plans.
Credible commitment can either be achieved through a legal mechanism, such as the
enforceability of certain government-private sector contracts in court, or through a political or
reputational mechanism. While recognizing that credibility and commitment are continuous
variables rather than zero-one dummies, it is a better first approximation to reality to use zero-one
dummies than to treat all government (and private sector) future plans as fully credible. In other
words, plans, anticipations, expectations, hopes and fears concerning future taxes and transfer
payments are imperfect substitutes for a complete set of contingent forward contracts, credibly
enforced, between the government and private agents. It therefore makes good sense, to a first
approximation, to treat government debt as a binding obligation of the government that will be
honored
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,

while taxes _and transfer payments remain subject to discretion and become certain

only when they are "in the bag". In addition, public debt is freely and voluntarily purchased or
sold by the private owner of the debt, something that may of considerable interest as argued
below. The irrelevance of the distinction between government debt, taxes and transfer payments
breaks down completely when there are incomplete markets.

For a number of legal and

informational reasons, human capital, that is, future labor earnings, makes very bad collateral
and so are future expected government transfer payments net of taxes. The abolition of slavery
and indentured labor, and the inalienability (or at least severely restricted alienability) of labor
income generally, account for the fact that financial claims and most physical, non-human assets
are far superior to human capital as collateralizable stores of value. Private information and the
associated problems of moral hazard and adverse selection provide an additional powerful reason
for the non-existence of many contingent forward markets for labor services, taxes and transfer
payments.
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In Kotlikoff [1989], it is noted that the argument concerning the redundancy of the public
debt and the sufficiency of the generational accounts breaks down when there are liquidity
constraints on consumption spending. Just how fatal these key features of the real world are for
the argument is not fully appreciated, however. With incomplete markets (specifically with
liquidity constraints), it matters that private agents voluntarily choose their holdings of public
debt while taxes constitute involuntary, non-discretionary payments by private agents. With
asymmetric (private) information, government debt can act as a self-selection device for those
who are not liquidity-constrained. The ability to issue public debt then enlarges the set of
equilibria that can be supported.
Consider the following simple example. Because of the fact that future labor income
cannot be attached, it cannot be used as collateral for private borrowing. Standard household
preferences favor consumption smoothing over the life cycle. Households without non-human
(liquid) wealth and with a rising age-earnings profile will therefore be constrained in their current
spending by current disposable income. Their marginal propensities to consume out of small
changes in current disposable income are unity. Households with positive non-human wealth
and/or flat or declining age-earnings profiles are constrained in their spending by permanent
income only. They will have marginal propensities to consume out of current disposable income
that are less than unity. During recessions (periods of low aggregate output), current labor income
is unusually low relative to future expected labor income. In addition non-human wealth may
decline. During booms (periods of high aggregate output), the opposite conditions prevail. The
force of the example is magnified if we assume that during a recession the fraction of households
that are current-disposable-income-constrained is higher than during a boom, but its qualitative
features do not depend on this. The business cycle could be entirely "real", driven by exogenous
shocks to average and marginal labor productivity, or it could be Keynesian.
The government taxes current labor income of all households at the same rate. The reason
could be that it cannot distinguish between households that are current-disposable-income
constrained and those that are only permanent-income-constrained. Labor is supplied inelastically.
Taxes (which can be negative) are therefore lump-sum but restricted. Government exhaustive
spending is constant and so is the interest rate on the public debt (say because we are dealing
with a small financially open economy and there is no government default risk).
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In scenario 1 the government has a balanced budget at each instant. This means high tax
rates in a slump and low tax rates during a boom. In scenario 2 the government keeps tax rates
constant over the cycle, at the level required to keep the public debt constant (possibly at zero)
over an entire cycle rather than period-by-period as in scenario 1. Relative to scenario 1, tax rates
are therefore lower in scenario 2 during a slump and higher during a boom.
The higher (relative to scenario 1) boom-time tax rates in scenario 2 do not cancel out the
positive effect on aggregate consumption during the slump of lower slump-time tax rates. The
public debt issued to finance the scenario 2 government deficit during a slump, will be bought
exclusively by households that are only permanent-income-constrained. Consumption during a
slump by current-disposable-income-constrained households in scenario 2 exceeds that in scenario
1 by the full amount by which their taxes are lower during a slump in scenario 2 than in scenario
1. The fact that they will pay higher taxes during the boom does not affect their consumption
decision during the slump, since they are current-disposable-income constrained. If they are still
current-disposable-income-constrained when the boom comes, their consumption in scenario 2
will be lower than their consumption in scenario 1 by the full amount of the excess of boom-time
taxes under scenario 2 over boom-time taxes under scenario 130 .
The government's borrowing and lending permit more consumption smoothing over the
business cycle than would be feasible with a continuously balanced budget. The consumption of
permanent-income-constrained households during the slump is the same in the two scenarios, as
the present discounted value of the taxes they pay over an entire cycle is the same. Note that
government borrowing during a slump permits it to extract additional resources from

the

permanent-income-constrained households, even though it cannot differentiate between them and
the current-disposable-income constrained households. Taxes, the involuntary resource transfer
mechanism, cannot be used to differentiate between the two types of households. Sales or
purchases of public debt, the voluntary resource transfer mechanism, cause the permanent-income
constrained households to differentiate themselves from the current-disposable-income-constrained
households.
The superior consumption smoothing permitted through the financial intermediation of the
government is desirable from an intertemporal allocation and welfare point of view even if there
are no Keynesian aggregate demand failures. The welfare costs of binding liquidity or current-
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disposable-income constraints would be more severe if a reduction in consumption demand during
a slump were to have Keynesian multiplier effects.
Note that in the example it is not just the present discounted value of the net cash (or
resource) flows between a liquidity-constrained private agent and the government (that is, the
household's generational account) which matters for the private agent's behavior. The actual time
pattern of the net cash flows matters for the liquidity-constrained household. While there may
exist a set of "shadow discount rates" (different from the interest rate on the public debt) that
reduce the sequence of cash flows of the liquidity-constrained household to a "shadow present
value", this does not add anything to the analysis.
The example just given goes to the heart of the Keynesian argument for countercyclical
government deficits. The neoclassical argument for countercyclical budgets is based on the
desirability of smoothing distortionary tax and transfer rates over time. Even if there is "first
order" debt neutrality or Ricardian equivalence (as in the intergenerational daisy-chain economy),
the option of departing from a balanced budget may be valuable if there are no lump-sum, non
distortionary tax-transfer schemes available. Borrowing, that is, the voluntary acquisition by the
private sector of a credible claim on the government for a future stream of payments, is a non
distortionary means of financing current outlays. Deficits and surpluses therefore permit changes
in the time-profile of the excess burden associated with non-lump-sum taxes and transfers. Tax
administration and collection costs that are increasing and strictly convex in the marginal tax rate
will provide a similar efficiency motive for departures of current outlays from current revenues.
Under rather restrictive separability and homogeneity assumptions, a strict tax rate smoothing
prescription emerges (see e.g. Barro [1979]). The proposition that, from a neoclassical public
finance point of view, balanced budgets are suboptimal is, however, more robust than the tax
smoothing result.

V. Public sector investment

An interesting indicator of the historical lack of importance attached to public sector
capital formation is the absence ·of systematic and readily available official statistics on the
subject. One looks in vain for data on Federal and State and Local investment in the Statistical
Tables attached to the Economic Report of the President. The Historical Tables published by the
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Office of Management and Budget [1992], contain annual series on "Federal Government Outlays
for Major Physical Capital Investment" from 1940 to 1991. Some of these are reproduced in
Table IO below. There is no government publication providing regular and comprehensive
statistics on state and local capital formation. Together these two no doubt account for more
infrastructure investment than the Federal government.
Based on Office of Management and Budget [1993], Table Cl, reproduced below as Table
11, the Major Federal capital outlays reported in Table 10, represent the overwhelming majority
of Total Federal capital formation today.
The capital formation figures in Tables IO and 11 refer to gross investment. In Office of
Management and Budget [1993], Table El, we are given figures on the stocks of physical
reproducible assets and inventories of the Federal government. These are given in Table 12. The
problems of valuing the stock of defense capital are daunting. What is an ICBM worth after the
collapse of the Soviet Union?
The real value of the reproducible Federal capital stock only increased by 22 billion 1992
dollars from 1991 to 1992. Out of $i36 billion gross investment by the Federal government in
1992 (Table 11), about 70 percent (see Table 10) or $ 165 billion was spent by the Federal
government directly rather than in the form of grants (mainly to state and local government).
This $165 billion gross investment must have been largely offset by $143 billion depreciation.
The view that net Federal government capital formation is currently close to zero is also
expressed in the 1993 Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers. The single paragraph
of the Report devoted to government investment (another indicator of the importance attached
to the issue in official circles until recently) also contains a non-sequitur and a potentially
misleading conclusion.
The non-sequitur relates to the Report's brief discussion of the failure of the government
budget to distinguish systematically between investment and consumption expenditures. It is a
familiar one. The Report notes, correctly, that it is not always easy to distinguish between capital
and current expenses. This is true, and it applies to private sector expenditures of time and
money on education, training, health, research and development and household production etc.,
as much as to public sector expenditures. 31

The Report goes on to say, again quite

uncontroversially, that the distinction between capital and current expenses can be subject to
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political controversy since special interests may have a stake in whether expenditures are labeled
as consumption or investment. It concludes that the current cash flow accounts "require less in
the way of arguable judgements" (p. 251 § 5). By requiring no judgement at all, the current cash
flow accounts treats capital and current spending as equivalent, which makes the accounts at best
uninformative and at worst misleading. The Report effectively argues that, if it is hard to get
something absolutely right, the proper response is to do something that is absolutely wrong!
The potentially misleading statement in the concluding sentence of the paragraph is the
following: "Several studies show that correcting recent deficits for government investments would
have resulted in relatively small changes because of offsetting adjustments for the depreciation
of the government's capital assets" (p. 251 ).
Let us accept the proposition that net (Federal) investment has indeed been close to zero
in recent years. What matters for the government's properly corrected deficit, whether we are
interested in the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio or of the net debt-GDP ratio, in the eventual
monetization of deficits or in solvency, is not, however, the magnitude of the government's net
investment flow. What matters are (I) the relationship between the government's marginal cost
of funds and the net cash rate of return it appropriates, directly or indirectly, on its new capital
assets should they remain in the public sector, r - (p-8), in the notation of Section III, and (2)
the value the new public sector capital could realize through sale outside the public sector
(through privatization), pk in terms of the notation of Section III.
By subtracting net investment from the conventionally measured government deficit, one
assumes implicitly that, whatever the real cash rate of return earned by an increment to the public
sector capital stock while it remains in the public sector, it is always possible to realize through
sale of the asset, the real historic cost of the investment (net of depreciation), that is, one
assumes that pk= p. It wouls seem to be extremely unlikely that this condition is satisfied for
some of the highly specialized public sector capital (let alone for the white elephants). The
extent to which investment is irreversible and investment costs are sunk is underestimated by
these
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net investment corrections". For instance, if a piece of infrastructure capital yields no

direct or indirect cash returns to the government and if it has no privatization value, then, for
government budgeting purposes, the investment in that piece of infrastructure is equivalent to
consumption. No corrections to the conventional deficit are required.
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VL Conclusion and fur1her food for thought.

How serious is the American government's budgetary problem? A minimalist view of the
US budgetary problem would lead one to focus on the achievement of a sustainable deficit.
Table (8a,b) and (9) summarize the relevant information. Extrapolating the 1992 cyclically
corrected deficit, the General government permanent primary gap is between 0.35% and 1.65%
of GDP. Taking the Clinton February 1993 proposals for the period 1993-98 as our benchmark,
the General government permanent primary gap is between 0.12% to 1.02% of GDP.
Despite the recent history of fiscal stalemate in Washington DC, a resolution of this
issue, that is, a credible way to fill these permanent primary gaps, should be in the feasible set.
This is the good news.
The bad news is that the currently visible deficit problem is but the tip of the iceberg.
Lurking under the water are, first, the spending trends already contained in the laws, programs
and regulations inherited by the Clinton administration. Prominent among these are planned
increases in Federal contributions to medicare and medicaid from $188.5 billion in the 1992
budget to $348.4 billion dollars in 1997 (under the ancien regime).
A continuation of the current levels of nominal and real interest rates, which now are low
throughout the maturity structure, both by recent historical and by international standards, is by
no means certain even in the short run and becomes quite unlikely when one looks a year or
more ahead. With a 50% debt-GDP ratio, every one percentage point increase in the level of
interest rates now adds 0.5% of GDP to the spending totals.
As longer-term problems loom the eventual disappearance of the Social Security current
surplus (the sum of the operating and interest surpluses). In the 1992 Federal Budget the Social
Security surplus was still predicted to increase from $50.2 billion in 1992 to $115.0 billion in
1997. The temptation to treat these surpluses as permanent current revenues will be hard to resist.
Also lurking under the water, but becoming gradually more visible, are the problems of
financing the kind of Federal, State and Local government programs that the new administration
has identified as necessary to meet America's needs in the fields of health care, education and
training, research and development, revitalization of the inner cities, deferred maintenance of
existing infrastructure and new infrastructure projects in the fields of public transport and
telecommunications.
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The revealed unwillingness of the American tax payer to shoulder a high and increasing
overall tax burden is reflected in Table 13, which shows General government current receipts as
a percentage of GDP for ten industrial countries. The US figure for 1989 is, at 31.8%, the lowest
of the ten. Only by Switzerland (34.1%) and Japan (33.4%) come close. For the whole of the
OECD except the USA, the figure is 40.3%. Table 14 shows how General government exhaustive
spending (purchases of final goods and services) has been essentially constant as a share of GDP
since 1960. The declining share of the Federal government has been offset by growth of the State
and Local sectors. The growth in the share of total public spending in GDP has been entirely
due to net interest and especially to social security and Medicare outlays.
This secular decline in the GDP share of Central government exhaustive spending is
unique to the US, among all the industrial countries. It is a reflection of the relative and abs9lute
weakness of the central government in this country and is reflected in the decrepit state of much
of the stock of social overhead capital. I anticipate that during the coming decade we will see
another form of "convergence" among the industrial countries. While many of the West-European
industrial countries will continue with attempts to reduce the size and scope of their oversized
public sectors, the US will see a movement in the opposite direction, to increase the size and
scope of its undersized public sector, especially at the Federal level.
Either the Clinton administration will have to shelve its programs and abandon its longer
term agenda in the areas mentioned earlier, or it will have to shift the political equilibrium in the
direction of a greater tolerance for higher taxes, perhaps at the level of Canada or Germany. The
resolution of this political economy problem will be much more difficult, and more important,
than coping with the deficits associated with the spending programs of the past 12 years. If the
Clinton economic and social agenda is to be realized,. the modest budgetary measures envisaged
in the February 1993 budget proposals are to be viewed as a first step in a more ambitious
program of tax increases, selective spending cuts and overall spending increases.
The recently proposed budgetary measures should have a favorable impact on the second
maJor macroeconomic problem faced by the American economy, that of the disappearing
American savings rate staring at us from Table 15. Both by historical and by international
standards, the 1990 gross national saving rate of 14.4% of GDP is extremely low. Even if a
lower national saving rate does not imply pari passu a lower rate of domestic investment (because
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would-be investors can borrow abroad to finance domestic capital formation), gross national
product will be lower than it would have been with a higher saving rate, and so will the future
living standards of US residents.

In addition there is evidence to support the view that a

reduction in the national saving rate does reduce domestic capital formation, even if not one-for
one (see e.g. Feldstein and Horioka [1980] and J.A. Frankel, M. Dooley and D. Mathieson
[1987]).
Measures to reduce the government deficit should increase the full employment national
saving rate, but less than dollar-for-dollar. The reduction in the deficit currently planned by the
Clinton administration only amounts to 2.3% of GDP (from 5.4% of GDP in 1993 to 3.1% of
GDP in 1998). Additional measures will therefore be required if the objective is to bring the US
saving rate back up to the 20% achieved in the early 70's, let alone up to a level consistent with
a comfortable retirement for the currently active generations and an adequate stock of capital
(physical and human) for future generations.
A start could be made with implementing proposals to fund social security retirement
plans, with individual accounts, at least for new entrants to the labor force. While this is a form
of "forced saving", a touch of benevolent paternalism might not be misplaced in the domain of
intertemporal choice32 . Finally, a consumption tax could be substituted for the Federal income
tax. Whether these three measures will suffice to push the American gross national saving rate
into the low twenties remains to be seen, but without them a continuation of the present abysmal
performance is all we can look forward to.
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Notes
I.For ease of exposition I use percentages, that is ratios* 100 rather than ratios.
2.It includes sponsored credit agencies and the Federal Reserve System. Some tangible wealth
is included for these agencies. Source: Economic Report of the President [ 1993], Table B-110.
3.The General government is the Federal government (including Social Security and Off-budget
funds), plus State and Local government
4.The Maastricht Treaty of December 1991 specified one of the fiscal convergency criteria for
membership in EMU in terms of the Gross General government debt-GDP ratio. See Buiter,
Corsetti and Roubini [1992].
5.The OECD [1992] puts the change in the cyclically-adjusted general government financial
deficit during 1991 and 1992 at 1. 5% of GDP less than the change in the uncorrected financial
deficit. The change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance during these same two years is
put at 1.6% of GDP less than the uncorrected financial deficit.
6.The NBER business cycle dating committee defines a recession as two or more successive
quarters of negative GDP growth. While everyone is entitled to their definition, I use the term
"recession" in a manner closer to common usage, to characterize a situation in which the growth
rate of actual output is below that of potential output. Potential output or productive capacity
will tend to grow more smoothly than actual output, because of labor force growth, capital
accumulation and technical progress.
7.The OECD [1992] figure of a General government primary deficit equal to 2.5% of GDP in
1992 is higher than the figure I obtain from US sources. The Office of Management and the
Budget [1993, Tables 15.5 and 15.6] gives a General government deficit of 4.7% of GDP in 1992
and net interest for that year equal to 2.6% of GDP, yielding a primary deficit (shown in Table
4) of 2.1% of GDP. For 1991 the OECD [1992] figure is a 1.1% of GDP deficit, while 0MB
[1993] comes up with a 1.9% of GDP deficit. The OECD figure, which is on a NIPA basis,
excludes deposit insurance outlays. This does not, however, account for all of the difference.
8.$55.8 billion or less than 1% of GDP at the end of 1991 if gold is valued at SDR 35 per ounce
and$ 160 billion (or 2.8% of GDP) if gold is valued at its market price.
9.This is different from the data reported in the previous section, which refer to the general
government only. When general government and central bank are consolidated, the interest
bearing liabilities of the consolidated unit ("the government") are the interest-bearing liabilities
of the general government net of the interest-bearing general government debt held by the central
bank (central bank credit to the general government) and minus foreign exchange reserves. The
monetary, non-interest bearing liabilities of the central bank become "government" monetary
liabilites.
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IO.Base money or high-powered money is a liability of the central bank. It is the sum of currency
held by the public and commercial bank reserves held with the central bank.
11. For simplicity the current reproduction cost of government capital is assumed to be given by
the GDP deflator. Internal adjustment and installation costs are also ignored.
12.p need not be the same as the real social rate of return on the public sector capital stock. Even ·
where this social rate of return is very high, the government may not be willing or able to
appropriate (capture) as cash income, directly (through charges or user fees) or indirectly (through
increases in the tax base brought about by the private productivity-enhancing effect of the public
sector capital stock) all or any of these social returns. Conversely the government could invest
in forms of capital that do not have any social returns, but whose only function is to facilitate
capturing revenue for the government. Examples are the construction of toll booths on freeways
and bridges.
13.What matters for the validity of the government solvency constraint that follows, is that
successive government administrations honor the debt they inherit.
14.Note that the primary surplus concept changes depending on the stock variable (debt or net
liabilities are the two alternatives considered here) that one assumes to constrain government
behavior.
15.The average length of maturity of interest-bearing public debt securities held by private
investors in November 1992 was 5 years and 11 months (Economic Report of the President
[1993], Table B-83). The average length has increased steadily from the mid-seventies until 1989
and has remained practically constant since then.
16.lf the reduction in the gap is due to a reduction in the nominal rate of interest, the demand
for money is likely to increase, and so may seigniorage. If the reduction in the gap is due to
higher inflation, the demand for money is likely to fall, and with it seigniorage. If it is due to an
increase in the growth rate of real GDP, the implications for real money demand and seigniorage
are ambiguous. For simplicity, the assumed share of seigniorage in GDP is held constant at
0.25% of GDP in these illustrative calculations.
17. In 1992 the sum of the payments to the public made by the Federal employees retirement
funds and the Military retirement fund was $57.5 billion or 0.97% of GDP (Office of
Management and Budget [1993], Table 4.3 or 3.2. ).
18.OECD Economic Outlook, 52, December 1992, Table 46, p. 146.
19.In both cases the cyclical corrections of the OECD[l992] are used.
20.Bohm [1992] estimates unfunded Federal Pension liabilities to be 19% of GDP in 1989.
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21. GNP data are quarterly figures expressed at quarterly rates. The interest rates and the rate of
inflation are also expressed at quarterly rates. The money stock is the end-of quarter monetary
base.
22. Note that the Fed uses its profits to pay a six percent rate of return to its shareholders and
to defray its costs, but that the Treasury is the residual claimant on the profits of the Fed.
Assuming that there are reasonably tight limits on the ability of the Fed to tum profits into
expenses, an independent Fed would not be very likely to be motivated by seigniorage
considerations.
23.Taxes and transfer payments are lump-sum when individual economic agents cannot influence
their incidence by changing their behavior. Such taxes and transfer payments are therefore non
distortionary (and also incapable of correcting any pre-existing distortions). Lump-sum taxes and
transfers can, however, influence individual behavior, but only through income effects.
24. Heterogeneity within generations can be added without changing the conclusions, as long as
there are unrestricted lump-sum taxes and transfers.
25.Here and in what follows, the magnitude and composition of the govenment's exhaustive
spending program is held constant across all alternative scenarios.
26.Because of the OLG structure there is incomplete market participation.
27.The argument that follows owes much to Henning Bohn's imposing paper on budget deficits
and government accounting (Bohn [1992]).
28.The same equilibrium supported by a complete set of contingent spot and forward markets can
also be supported by (I) a complete set of contingent forward market for the numeraire and (2)
a sequence of complete spot markets for all other goods. This won't help, because neither (I) nor
(2) applies in a world with interesting asymmetric information.
29.Except possibly under certain extreme circumstances when honoring these commitments would
either be infeasible or prohibitively costly. Force majeure is a well-recognized legal principle.
30.If they are no longer current-disposable-income-constrained when the boom comes, their
boom-time consumption need not be lower in scenario 2 by the full amount of the difference in
boom-time taxes between the two scenarios.
31.Even if the capital vs. current issue is settled, there exist equally severe problems with the
proper economic classification of much of the spending correctly identified as non-capital.
Government current spending on "regrettable necessities" such as defense, law and order and
most public administration is not consumption spending al all (who enjoys the sight of civil
servants at work?), but spending on intermediate public goods and services (often non-rival up
to some level of private activity, but congestible beyond that point). However valuable or even
essential for the production of true final goods and services, such expenditures are not themselves
final expenditures. They therefore should not be counted in GDP or value added at all. Again,

47
similar problems arise in the private sector. Current private expenditures on health and private
security services also are intermediate in nature and should not be counted as consumption or
investment. The same holds for many goods and services (grass seeds, pool cleaning) that are
intermediate inputs in household economic activity.
32.A key empirical issue is the magnitude of the reduction in discretionary private saving when
a forced saving scheme like funded social security retirement saving is introduced.
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Table 1

General goverrunent net debt
selected OECD Countries% of GDP
Liabilities (+) or assets (-)
1974

1979

1989

1992

High-debt
countries
Belaium
Italv
Ireland
Greece

47.2

62.0
55.6
73.4
27.6

120.3
96.1
107.3
73.5

124.3
106.7
97.4
81.7

59.9

21.8
12.1
36.0
19.1
5.8
47.8

57.2
40.3
56.9
30.4
30.4
30.4

59.7
53.7
52.1
37.9
35.8
35.6

-13.6
8.1
-4.7

1.8
13.8
11.5

..

..

-10.6
-5.3
-30.1
-9.2
14.2

-6.8
14.9
-19.8
9.8
22.7

26.0
24.8
22.5
12.2
-1. 6
14.7
-5.4
-20.2
39.8

29.1
28.8
22.7
15.8
11.0
6.1

44.6

57.6
20.3

Medium-debt
countries
Netherlands
Canada
Austria
USA

Si:>ain
UK

19.0
4.9
17.6
21. 7

..

Low-debt
countries
Denmark
France
Germanv
Australia
Finland
Jaoan
Sweden
Norwav
'.a.vc::i,-r:::atTir::::.a

Note:

3.4

-16.6
43.6

The data for Austria, Greece and Ireland refer to gross
financial liabilities.
The debt data for Australia refer to fiscal years.
a) Unweighted average.
Source: OECD Economic OUt1ook, 52, December 1992.
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Table 2

General government gross public debt
seven largest OECD countries
(% of GDP)
1992a

1988

1984
USA

45.2

53.2

63.0

Japan

67.9

72.8

64.9

Germany

42.0

44.8

44.0

Franceb

43.8

46.8

50.1

Italy

77.4

94.8

108.4

UK

54.6

42.5

41.9

Canada

59.1

69.3

82.3

53.2

59.1

63.0

Average
a) OECD
b) Does
c) 1987
Source:

0

estimates.
not exclude public sector mutual indebtedness.
GDP weights and exchange rates.
OECD Economic outlook, 52, December 1992.
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Table 3

General Government financial surpluses,
selected OECD Countries.
(% of GDP)
1972

1980

1990

USA

0.5

-1.0

-3.4

Japan

0.5

-3.8

2.4

Germany

1.2

-3.7

-3.2

France

0.6

-1. 9

-2.2

Italy

-7.9

-11.6

-10.2

UK

-2.7

-2.6

-2.8

Canada

0.9

-1.5

-6.1

Netherlands

0.9

-5.5

-2.6

Sweden

4.1

-5.3

-1.5

Source, OECD Economic outlook, 52, December 1992

Table 4
Primary balances for the Federal and State and Local governments in the USA.
General

Federal

State and Local

Financial
surplus

Net
interest
paid

Primary
surplus

1947

2.5

1.9

4.4

1.8

1. 9

3.7

0.7

0.0

0.7

1960

0.1

1.4

1.5

0.1

1.4

1.5

0.1

o.o

0.1

1970

0.1

1.3

1.4

-0.3

1.5

1.2

0.4

-0.2

0.2

1980

-1. 9

1.3

-0.6

-2.8

2.0

-0.8

0.9

-0.7

0.2

1985

-4.0

2.3

-1.7

-5.3

3.3

-2.0

1.4

-1.0

0.4

1990

-3.5

2.4

-1.1

-4.0

3.4

-0.6

0.6

-1.0

-0.4

1991

-4.5

2.6

-1.9

-4.8

3.5

-1.3

0.3

-0.9

-0.6

1992

-4.7

2.6

-2.1

-4.9

Financial
surplus

Net
interest
paid

Primary
surplus

Financial
surplus

Net
interest
paid

Primary
surplus

-1.5
0.3
-0.8
-0.5
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and Alternatives for
the Future, January 1993.
3.4

Vt
~
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Table 5

General govermnent primary balances

a

seven largest OECD countries
(Surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a percentage of GDP)
1984

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

USAb

-0.9

-0.1

0.5

-0.4

-1.1

-2.5

Japanc' d

-0.3

2.5

3.4

3.6

2.8

1.7

~ermany

0.4

0.2

2.4

0.1

-1.0

-0.6

France

-0.9

0.5

1.1

1.0

0.3

-0.2

Italy

-4.1

-3.1

-1.4

-1.8

-0.5

-0.2

UK

-0.6

3.7

3.3

1. 0

-0.9

-4.5

Canada

-2.9

1. 9

1. 8

1.3

-0.5

-0.3

Averaged

-0.9

0.7

1.5

0.7

0.0

-1.1

a)Overall balance less net interest payments on public debt.
Figures are on a SNA basis except for the USA and the UK where
the data are based on national methods.
b)Excludes deposit insurance outlays.
c)OECD estimates and projections.
d)Net property income paid rather than net interest payments is
used as the latter is not available.
e)1987 GDP weights and exchange rates.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, 52, December 1992.
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Table 6

Interest rates and GNP growth rates in the USA
(% p.a.)

Average growth rate

Average short rate*

Average long rate

of nominal GNP
1953-92

7.39

5.57

6.84

1953-59

5.11

2.22

3.22

1960-69

6.88

3.98

4.67

1970-79

10.09

6.29

7.49

1980-89

7.67

8.82

10.59

1980-92

6.92

8.04

9.95

* ·1 ree month Treasury Bill rate.
** Yield on ten year Treasury securities.
Source: see Figure 4.
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Table 7
Interest rates and nominal GDP growth rates,
Clinton budget economic assumptions.
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

5.3

5.9

6.2

5.7

5.5

5.5

5.5

91-Day
Treasury
Bill
Rate
(%**)

3.5

3.7

4.3

4.7

4.8

4.9

5.0

10-Year
Treasury
Note
Rate
(%**)

7.0

6.7

6.6

6.5

6.5

6.4

6.4

Nominal

GDP
growth
(% *)

* Percent change,· fourth quarter over fourth quarter.
* * Annual average.

Source: A Vision of Change for America [1993].
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Table 8a
Federal government
Minimal Required Permanent Primaiy Smplus
& Seigniorage
(%of GDP)

(1)

Interest rate minus growth rate (% p.a.)

0.00

1.00

2.00

(2)

Debt-GDP ratio (annual, %)

65.00

65.00

65.00

(3)

Required permanent primacy surplus plus
seigniorage (% GDP)

0.00

0.65

1.30

(4)

Assumed permanent seigniorage(% GDP)

0.25

0.25

0.25

(5)

Required permanent primacy surplus(% GDP)

-0.25

0.40

1.05

(6)

1992 Actual primacy surplus (%GDP)

-1.5

-1.5

-1.5

(7)

1992 Cyclically corrected primacy surplus
( % GDP)8

0.01

0.01

0.01

(8)

Federal retirement and disability benefit
payments correction (% GDP)

0.60

0.60

0.60

(9)*

Permanent primacy gap (% GDP)

-0.21

0.44

* (9)

= (5)

- (7) - (8).

-0.86
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Table 8b
General government
Minimal Required Permanent Primacy Smplus & Seigniorage
(%of GDP)
(1)

Interest rate minus growth rate (% p.a.)

0.00

1.00

2.00

(2)

Debt-GDP ratio (annual, %)

45.0

45.0

45.0

(3)

Required permanent primacy surplus & ·seigniorage
(%GDP)

0.00

0.45

0.90

(4)

Assumed permanent seigniorage (% GDP)

0.25

0.25

0.25

-0.25

U.-~

.

'-"'}

; _____anent primacy surplus (% GDP)

(6)

1992 Actual primacy surplus (%GDP) (OECD[1992])

-2.5

-2.5

-2.5

(7)

1992 Actual primacy surplus (%GDP) (OMB[1993])

-2.1

-2.1

-2.1

1992 Cyclically co~cted primacy surplus ( % GDP)
(OECD[1992])8

-1.0

-1.0

-1.0

1992 Cyclically co~cted primacy surplus ( % GDP)
(0MB[1993]) 8 b

-0.6

-0.6

-0.6

Permanent primacy gap (% GDP) (OECD[1992])

0.75

1.20

1.65

0.35

0.80

1.25

(8)

8

(9)

8

(10)*

(11)*
Permanent primacy gap (% GDP) (OMB[1993])
.
a Assummg a zero cyclical co~ction 1s applied m 1990•
h The OECD[1992] cyclical co~ction is applied.
*(10) = (5) - (8)
**(11) = (5) - (9)

.

. .

. .
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Table 9
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S PROPOSED STRUCTURAL DEFICITS
(Fiscal years, in billions of dollars)
1993

Baseline deficit

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

319.2

301.3

295.9

297.0

346.3

389.7

66.8

51.6

36.3

24.0

16.8

16.1

Deposit
insurance

6.9

7.9

-4.0

-12.5

-11.3

-7.3

Baseline
structural
deficit

245.5

241.8

263.6

285.5

340.8

380.9

Effect of policy
proposals

12.7

-38.9

-54.2

-91.7

-139.8

-148.3

Proposed deficit"

332
(5.4)

262
(4.0)

242
(3.5)

205
(2.9)

206
(2.7)

241
(3.1)

Proposed
structural
deficit"

258.2
(4.2)

202.9
(3.1)

209.4
(3.0)

193.8
(2.7)

201.0
(2.6)

232.6
(3.0)

Net interest"

202.1
(3.2)

212.0
(3.2)

227.2
(3.2)

243.3
(3.2)

257.4
(3.3)

272.7
(3.3)

56.1
(1.0)

-9.1
(-0.1)

-17.8
(-0.2)

-49.5
(-0.5)

-56.4
(-0.7)

-40.1
(-0.3)

Cyclical
component

Proposed
structural
primacy deficit"

* As a percentage of GDP given in parentheses below $ amount
Source: A vision of change for America, Tables 3-1 and 3-2 and Appendix Tables 7 and 12,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. February 1993. GDP estimate for 1991 from
Economic Report of the President [1993].
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Table 10
Federal oudays for major public physical capital investment
(%of GDP)
Direct Federal
Total

Grants
Total

Defense

Non-defense

1940

3.5

3.0

0.9

2.1

0.5

1944

29.7

29.7

29.5

0.1

0.1

1960

4.4

3.8

3.4

0.4

0.7

1970

3.4

2.7

2.4

0.3

0.7

1980

2.4

1.5

1.2

0.3

0.9

1985

2.9

2.3

2.0

0.3

0.6

1990

2.4

1.9

1.6

0.3

0.5

1991

2.3

1.8

1.5

0.3

0.5

1992

2.3

1.8

1.4

0.4

0.5

Source:Office of Management and Budget, Budget Baselines,
Historical, Data, and Alternatives for tlze Future, Janmuy 1993.
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Table 11
Composition of Federal Capital Oudays
(billions of dollars)
1992 actual
Major Federal capital oudays

1993 estimate

232.8

244.1

Defense

119.7

117.5

Non-defense

113.1

126.7

Miscellaneous physical capital

3.3

4.7

Commodity- inventories

-0.9

-0.3

4.2

4.9

236.1

248.8

Other (non-defense, direct)
TOTAL

Source: Office of Management and Budget, Budget Baselines,
Historical. Data, and Alternatives for the Future, Janmuy 1993,
Table C-1, p. 506.
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Table 12
Federal government reproducible capital stock.
(end of fiscal year, billions of 1992 dollars)

1960

1970

1980

1985

1990

1991

1992

Fixed
reproducible
capital

973

1014

816

885

960

965

985

Defense

827

828

574

652

721

730

741

Nondefense

146

186

243

233

238

235

244

Inventories

252

200

216

237

206

185

187

1225

1214

1032

1122

1166

1150

1172

Total
reproducible
capital

Source: Office of Management and Budget [1993), Budget Baselines, mstorical Data, and
Alternatives for tl,e Future, January, Table E-1, p. 522.
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Table 13

General government current receipts
selected OECD Countries.
(%

of GDP)
1989

1980

1971
USA

28.2

30.8

31.8

Japan

21. 6

27.6

33.4

Germany

39.4

44.9

45.0

France

37.7

44.5

46.4

Italy

31.1

33.0

41.1

UK

38.3

39.9

40.2

Canada

34.7

36.2

40.1

Netherlands

43.3

52.8

49.9

Sweden

49.4

56.3

64.2

Switzerland

26.2

32.8

34.1

Total OECD
less USA

33.6

38.4

40.3

Source, OECD Economic Outlook, 52, December 1992
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Table 14

U.S.A. Government expenditures, 1947-1992
(%

General
Government
spendinga

1947

20.4
(NA)

Net
interest

1. 9

of

GDP)

Federal
aspending

15.5
(NA)

Federal
soc. sec
and
medicare

State
and
Local
spending
from own
sourcesa
4.9

0.2

(NA)

1960

26.1
(19. 7)

1. 4

18.3
(11. 0)

2.3

7.8
(8. 7)

1970

29.7
(21. 3)

1.3

19.9
(10. 2)

3.7

9.8
(11.1)

1980

31.5
(18. 6)

1.3

22.3
(7. 6)

5.7

9.2
(11. 0)

1985

33.0
(19. 0)

2.3

23.9
(8. 4)

6.5

9.2
(10. 6)

1990

33.0
(18.8)

2.4

22.9
(7. 6)

6.5

10.1
(11.2)

1991

34.1
(19.2)

2.6

23.5
(7. 9)

6.8

10.6
(11. 3)

23.5

7.1

1992

34.4
(NA)

2.6

(NA)

10.9
(NA)

a) Purchases of final goods and services in brackets.
Source: Office of Management and Budget, Budget
Baselines, Historical Data, and Alternatives for the
Future, January 1993.
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Table 15

Gross natio nal savin g rates
selecte d OECD Countr ies.
(%

of GDP)

1974

1980

1990

USA

20.1

19.2

14.4

Japan

36.3

31.1

34.6

Germany

24.7

21. 7

24.6

France

26.8

23.6

21.2

Italy

26.0

24.7

19.3

UK

15.2

17.7

15.6

Canada

25.6

22.9

16.7

Netherla nds

27.4

20.1

25.4

Sweden

22.0

17.2

17.1

Switzer land

31. 7

26.7

33.1

OECD Europe

25.8

20.6

21.8

Source, OECD Economi c OUtl.ook , 52, Decembe r 1992

